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’…the most relevant and beautiful problems in dogmatics begin at the very point where the fable of 
“unprofitable scholasticism” and the slogan about the “Greek thinking of the Fathers” persuade us 
we ought to stop.’1 
 
Abstract: 
It has been commonplace for over a century to argue that the distinctively Lutheran form 
of the communicatio idiomatum leads naturally to kenotic christology, divine passibility, or 
both. This argument has been generally accepted as a historical claim; it has also been 
advanced repeatedly as a criticism of ‘classical theism’ in the literature, and it has featured 
significantly in almost all recent defences of divine passibility. I argue that it does not 
work: the Lutheran scholastics had ample resources drawn from nothing more than 
ecumenical Trinitarian and christological dogma to defend their denial of the genus 
tapeinoticum. I argue further that this defence, if right, undermines a remarkably wide 
series of proposals in contemporary systematic theology. 
 
 
Introduction 
For well over a century, theologians have been arguing that the distinctively Lutheran 
form of the communicatio idiomatum, which accepts the genus maiestaticum, leads naturally 
to kenotic christology, divine passibility, or both. Indeed, it is not hard to find suggestions 
that the move is so obvious that the interesting question is why the scholastic Lutheran 
theologians could not see it, a question generally answered by lamenting their captivity to 
alien hellenistic conceptions of deity (recently termed ‘classical theism’). In this essay I 
argue that this long-standing historical interpretation is wrong. The paper falls into three 
sections, after some definitions of key technical terms: a demonstration that the position 
under consideration has been so normal as to be generally assumed without argument 
since about 1860; a close reading of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Lutheran 
dogmaticians to show that it is simply wrong; and a consideration of the significance of 
this discovery. 
 
 
1. A lasting systematic connection 
The communicatio idiomatum (communication of attributes/properties) is a standard theme 
of scholastic christology, common to Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Reformed, and Lutheran 
dogmaticians. The ecumenical doctrine affirms that the proper attributes of both divine 
and human natures are given (‘communicated’) to the one person of the incarnate Son, 
who is thus properly named as both divine and human, both omnipresent and local, both 
eternal and born of the Virgin. As a result of the Eucharistic controversies which split the 
early Reformation, a debate arose concerning this doctrine: Zwingli, and the Reformed 
tradition following him, argued that, since body and blood were properties of the human 
nature, they were necessarily local, and so could not be simultaneously present on many 
altars; the Lutheran response was to suggest that the proper attributes of the divine nature 
                                                 
1 Karl Barth, C.D. I/1, p. xiv. 
  
were communicated, not just to the person, but to the human nature, and so that the 
human nature could transcend spatial restrictions, and be present on many altars 
simultaneously. 
 
This debate led to extensive scholastic analysis of the communicatio idiomatum. Three 
genera of the communicatio were identified: the genus idiomaticum, which names the 
attribution of the properties of both natures to the person; the genus apostelesmaticum, 
which names the perfect cooperation of the two natures, with all their properties, in the 
work of the Mediator; and the genus maiestaticum, which names the participation in the 
majesty, and so the properties, of the divine nature by the human nature. The former two 
were affirmed ecumenically; the last was affirmed by the Lutherans but denied by the 
Reformed, and so was the crux of debate. ‘Lutheran christology’ in all that follows in this 
essay means simply a scholastic christology that affirms the genus maiestaticum. For 
completeness, we need to note the logical possibility of a fourth genus, the genus 
tapeinoticum, which would, if affirmed, name the participation in the weakness and 
limitation of human nature by the divine nature. In the scholastic period, this existed only 
as a polemical invention of the Reformed, asking why the Lutherans affirmed 
communication from one nature to the other in one direction, but not in the other.2 
 
With these definitions and distinctions in place, the argument connecting Lutheran 
christology, kenosis, and divine passibility is easy to sketch: the genus maiestaticum affirms 
the communication of divine properties to the human nature; but (as the Reformed 
insisted) Chalcedonian christology seems to assert a basic symmetry between the two 
natures, suggesting that, without good reason to think otherwise, what happens from 
nature to nature should be symmetrical. Therefore, if the genus maiestaticum is affirmed, so 
should be the genus tapeinoticum, the communication of the properties of the human nature 
to the divine nature. It should, therefore, be asserted that the divine nature becomes 
mutable (allowing an account of kenosis) and passible, because mutability and passibility 
are proper attributes of the human nature. 
 
In 1856, Isaak Dorner already saw Thomasius’s development of kenotic christology as a 
result of precisely this move, blaming (rather remarkably) the first edition of his own 
Entwicklungsgeschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi. He cites himself as saying ‘The fault 
of the Lutheran Christology lies ultimately in the incomplete carrying out of the 
“Communicatio idiomatum,” or in the circumstance that the communication is not 
represented as actually reciprocal, that the finite determinations are not really taken up 
into the divine nature.’3 Dorner suggests, and the evidence bears out, that Thomasius’s 
Beiträge zur kirchlichen Christologie4 explicitly picks up this hint and develops it in ways that 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Francisco Turretino, Institutio Theologiae Elencticae (3 tom.) (Edinburgh: John D. Lowe, 1847) tom. 2; 
XIII.8.xii (p. 286 of edition cited): ‘Quia si propter Unionem proprietates divinae communicatae sunt Carni, 
Ergo vicissim proprietates Carnis debuerunt communicari Logoi quia unio est reciproca…’ The second 
section of this essay will be mainly concerned with Lutheran responses to this argument. 
3 Isaak A. Dorner (tr. D.W. Simon), History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ ii.2 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1866), p. 427. 
4 D.G. Thomasius, Beiträge zur kirchlichen Christologie (Addend auss der ZPK) (Erlangen: Theodor Bläsing, 
1845). (This is a republication with addenda of the two original articles.) See pp. 97-104 for the development 
of the theory along the lines Dorner sketched out, and p. 63 for an explicit reference to the relevant part of 
Dorner’s first edition. On Thomasius’s christology see David R. Law, ‘Le kenotisme luthérien et anglican: les 
 
  
Dorner came to view as ‘unripe and untenable’.5 The criticism, however, is that it involves 
a doctrine of God that is not ethical. Dorner, that is, criticises Thomasius for a failure to 
follow (what Dorner sees as) a primary condition placed on dogmatics post-
Schleiermacher,6 not for misreading the Lutheran tradition; he apparently continues to 
believe that kenoticism is a valid scholastic development of Luther’s ideas. Indeed, the 
reader of his account of the various debates between the Schwabians and Chemnitz,7 and 
then between the theologians of Giessen and those of Tübingen,8 might well be left 
thinking that he believes it to be the only valid development, although untenable in the 
light of the Schleiermacher’s re-orientation of dogmatics.9 
 
Thomasius himself was convinced that the heart of his work, developing moves already 
underway at Erlagen when he arrived, was a renewal of classical Lutheranism. His 1848 
work on the confessional inheritance of Lutheranism makes this very clear.10 Historians of 
kenotic Christology have since repeatedly made the same link, right down to the present 
decade.11 It seems that there has been broad agreement that kenotic Christology is a 
natural development of the Lutheran doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum. Of course, 
saying this raises the question of why there was no (or perhaps little) true kenoticism 
                                                 
christologies de Gottfried Thomasius et Frank Weston’ Études Theologiques et Religieuses 89 (2014), pp. 313-
340. 
5 Dorner, History, ii.2 p, 427. This rather remarkable mea culpa appears not to have been widely noticed in the 
literature. 
6 See I.A. Dorner (tr. Alfred Cave), A System of Christian Doctrine vol. 1 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1880), pp. 
412ff., and I.A. Dorner (tr. R.R. Williams & Claude Welch), Divine Immutability: A critical reconsideration 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994). For a fine account of this theme in Dorner, see Jonathan Norgate, Isaak A. 
Dorner: The Triune God and the Gospel of Salvation (London: T&T Clark, 2009), pp. 10-52. Other useful 
secondary treatments include: Robert R. Williams, ‘I.A. Dorner: The ethical immutability of God’ JAAR 54 
(1986), pp. 721-38; Robert Sherman, ‘Isaak August Dorner on Divine Immutability: A missing link between 
Schleiermacher and Barth’, J. Rel. 77 (1997), pp. 380-401. For two different genealogies that downplay 
Schleiermacher but nevertheless do not invalidate my point about this being a nineteenth-century concern, 
see Robert E. Brown, ‘Schelling and Dorner on Divine Immutability’ JAAR 52 (1985), pp. 237-49, and Piotr J. 
Malysz, ‘Hegel’s Conception of God and its Application by Isaak Dorner to the Problem of Divine 
Immutability’ Pro Ecc. 15 (2006), pp. 448-71. 
7 Dorner, History, pp. 177-192; 198-208. 
8 Dorner, History, pp. 281-300. 
9 David R. Law,  ‘Luther’s Legacy and the Origins of Kenotic Christology’ BJRL 93 (2017), pp. 41-68, suggests 
Sartorius, rather than Dorner, as the key influence for Thomasius, relying on a footnote in which the latter 
highlights the work of the former. As Law notes, Breidert finds the identification of Sartorius as an early 
kenoticist implausible (M. Breidert, Die kenotische Christologie des 19. Jahrhunderts (Gütersloh: Gütersloher 
Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1977), p. 39, which is cited in Law, ‘Luther’s Legacy…’ n.49 on p. 65). It is of course 
possible that Thomasius found inspiration in a misreading of Sartorius, whose work (on Law’s telling) is not 
always completely consistent. All that said, Law’s essay begins and ends with assertions that kenotic 
Christology finds its origins in Luther, so he is not opposed to the historical line I am developing here, 
regardless of any difference over influences on Thomasius. 
10 Gottfried Thomasius, Das Bekenntnis der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche in der Konsequenz seines Prinzips 
(Nuremberg: A. Recknagel, 1848). 
11 To take only a sample: Francis J. Hall, The Kenotic Theory: Considered with particular reference to its Anglican 
forms and arguments (London: Longmans, Green, and co., 1898), pp. 13-15; Oscar Bensow, Die Lehre von der 
Kenose (Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1903), pp. 15-28 and 42-52; John Stewart Lawton, Conflict in Christology: A Study 
of British and American Christology from 1889-1914 (London: SPCK, 1947), p. 119; Donald G. Dawe, ‘A Fresh 
Look at the Kenotic Christologies’ SJT 15 (1962), pp. 337-349, p. 341; M. Breidert, Kenotische Christologie, pp. 
19-23; David Brown, Divine Humanity: Kenosis and the construction of a Christian theology (Waco, TX: Baylor 
University Press, 2011), pp. 27-29; David R. Law, ‘Kenotic Christology’ in David Fergusson (ed.), The 
Blackwell Companion to Nineteenth-Century Theology (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), pp. 251-279, pp. 253-255. 
 
  
before the nineteenth century;12 the answer would seem to be Dorner’s ethical turn, 
already referenced above. If the essence of divine majesty is understood as omnipotence, 
omniscience, and omnipresence, then a kenotic theory that involves the divine Logos 
laying down these attributes is difficult to imagine;13 if however we accept Dorner’s re-
orientation of the doctrine of divine perfection, such that ‘moral’ attributes such as love or 
holiness are of the essence of divine majesty, then it is far easier to develop a kenotic 
theory. This distinction was used extensively by kenoticists from Thomasius to Forsyth 
(and beyond).14 
 
The connection between Lutheran christology and kenoticism seems, then, well 
established virtually from the beginnings of serious kenotic theories in the middle of the 
nineteenth century. Divine passibility becomes a common idea later still, although it is 
linked explicitly to Lutheran christology even before its recent popularity. There is a 
debate over divine passibility in England culminating in two significant works from the 
1920s,15 but the theme only becomes pervasive in systematic theology in the second half of 
the twentieth century—although it does then become pervasive: in the 1980s, writers on 
both sides of the Atlantic could suggest that it had become so common as to be a ‘new 
orthodoxy’.16 If Moltmann’s Crucified God is the great work announcing this new 
movement, its genealogy runs from a particular reading of Barth, mediated by Jüngel, 
through Jenson, Moltmann, and Pannenberg, to (inter alia) Fiddes. 
 
                                                 
12 Discussing Chemnitz and his followers, Dorner comments, tantalisingly, that they taught ‘…[t]he 
communication of the natures to each other; in this case, the communication to the divine nature was usually 
omitted…’ (Dorner, History, ii.2, p. 287; my emphasis). He gives no reference, and I have not been able to 
discover to whom he might have been referring, but the qualification suggests that he was aware of at least 
one early modern Lutheran who proposed the genus tapeinoticum. Welch raises the question as to why this 
issue did not become pressing earlier, and suggests that the nineteenth-century focus on Christology is 
sufficient answer; I am not sure that this is adequate, as there had been previous moments of extensive focus 
on Christology within Lutheran dogmatics, not least the Schwabian debates with Chemnitz and the Giessen-
Tübingen debate already mentioned. Welch, God and Incarnation… pp. 6-9.  
13 The seventeenth-century Lutheran theologians (on both the Tübingen and Giessen sides) had argued for a 
kenosis of the logos ensarkos, which generally amounted to the voluntary hiding (Tübingen) or shedding 
(Giessen; again, the word ‘kenosis’ was used) of the majestic attributes conferred on the human nature by 
the human nature. As Mark Elliott puts it: ‘[b]oth sides were in agreement that the subjectum quo of kenosis is 
the Person, but the subjectum quod is the exalted humanity of the incarnation… Seventeenth-century 
Lutherans would hardly have thought that the Logos as such could lose any of his divine properties.’ M.W. 
Elliott, ‘Christology in the Seventeenth Century’, in Francesca A. Murphy (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Christology (Oxford: OUP, 2015), pp. 297-314, p. 304. 
14 For this in Thomasius himself, see Gottfried Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk: Darstellung der evangelisch-
lutherischen Dogmatik… (3 Bd) (Erlangen: Blasig, 1856-1863), i.20-208. 
15 J.K. Mozley, The Impassibility of God: A Survey of Christian Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1926) and Bertrand R. Brasnett, The Suffering of the Impassible God (London: SPCK, 1928). Alfred North 
Whitehead also argued for divine passibility around this time (see, e.g., the famous description of God as a 
‘fellow sufferer who understands’ Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Reality Corrected Edition (New 
York: Free Press, 1978 [1929]), p. 351). Whitehead made no reference to Luther, and so is not very relevant 
for my ongoing argument; his entire programme, however, depended on suggesting a Platonic infection of 
Christian theology, and so he does exemplify at least one point of my reconstruction. 
16 Ronald Goetz, ‘The Suffering God: The rise of a new orthodoxy’ Christian Century 103 (1986), p. 385, uses 
this phrase; Paul S. Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) comments similarly 
of ‘academic circles’ that ‘the idea that God suffers hardly needs to be argued for any longer.’ (p. 1). 
 
  
In the earlier English debate, Lutheran christology was offered as the most 
straightforward account of divine passibility in the tradition. Mozley cites two (fairly 
occasional) works of Luther—a sermon, and the Table Talk—which both contain assertions 
of divine passibility based on a simple symmetrical account of the communication 
between divine and human natures.17 He then turns to Gerhard for a more systematic 
treatment,18 and finds a clear statement that the Logos truly suffered and died in the 
human nature, on the basis of which Gerhard claimed that we can say ‘God suffered’ just 
as straightforwardly as we can say ‘God is man’. Mozley appears to think that this is 
significant, but it is of course unremarkable according to the conciliar tradition, mirroring 
the ‘theopaschite’ formula declared orthodox at Constantinople II in 553, ‘unus de trinitate 
carne passus est.’19 
 
There is no revolutionary account of divine passibility in Gerhard, then; what of Luther? 
Lugioyo’s warnings about the impossibility of systematising Luther’s christology are 
significant,20 but there seems to be general agreement amongst more recent commentators 
that Mozley’s reading is correct: Lugioyo himself, Ngien, Jenson, and Weinandy all read 
Luther in the same way,21 citing texts far more central to the corpus.22 Dorner had read 
Luther like this also.23 It is certainly possible to find texts in Luther that seem to claim, 
more traditionally, that the incarnate Logos suffers only in his human nature, whilst 
remaining impassible in his divine nature,24 but the overall thrust of Luther’s christology 
seems to involve a symmetrical transference of properties between the natures, and so, 
necessarily, a passible deity. Following Congar, Weinandy suggests that this is because of 
a certain lack of interest in the metaphysical content of the word ‘person’, which is 
reduced to merely the product of the union of the two natures.25 Zachhuber is less willing 
to accept Luther as a forerunner of divine passibility, arguing that the passages speaking 
of God suffering should be read as deliberately shocking embraces of paradox designed to 
make explicitly Christological points.26 That said, he does make a similar point to 
                                                 
17 Mozley, Impassibility, pp. 121-123. 
18 Mozley, Impassibility, pp. 123-125. 
19 On the theopaschites and the origin of the formula, see J.A. McGuckin, ‘The “Theopaschite Confession” 
(Text and Historical Context): A study in the Cyrillic re-interpretation of Chalcedon’ JEH 35 (1984), pp. 239-
255. 
20 Brian Lugioyo, ‘Martin Luther’s Eucharistic Christology’ in Francesca A. Murphy (ed.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Christology, (Oxford: OUP, 2015), pp. 267-283. As Congar points out, one of the particular 
problems is that, in the German works, Luther uses ‘Wesen’ to mean both ‘nature’ and ‘person’, introducing 
inevitable ambiguity and confusion. Yves M.-J. Congar, ‘Regards et réflexions sur la christologie de Luther’ 
in Aloys Grillmeier und Heinrich Bacht (hrsg.), Das Konzil von Chalkedon: Geschichte und Gegenwart Bd III 
(Würzburg: Echter-Verlag Wuurzburg, 1959), pp. 457-486, p. 482. 
21 Lugioyo, ‘Martin Luther’s Eucharistic Christology’, p. 278; Dennis Ngien, ‘Chalcedonian Christology and 
Beyond: Luther’s Understanding of the Communicatio Idiomatum’ HeyJ XLV (2004), pp. 54-68; idem. The 
Suffering of God According to Martin Luther’s ‘Theologia Crucis’ (Vancouver: Regent College Publishing, 2005); 
Robert W. Jenson, ‘Christ in the Trinity: The Communicatio Idiomatum’ in Stephen R. Holmes and Murray A. 
Rae (eds), The Person of Christ (London: T&T Clark International, 2005), pp. 61-69, p. 66; Thomas G. 
Weinandy, Does God Change? The Word’s Becoming in the Incarnation (Still River, MA: St Bede’s Publications, 
1985), pp.104-108. 
22 See particularly Ngien’s reference to the Schwabach Articles; Ngien, ‘Chalcedonian Christology…’, p. 56. 
23 Dorner, History, ii.2, pp.281-307. 
24 See, e.g., the 1528 Confession Concerning Christ’s Supper. 
25 Weinandy, Does God Change?, pp. 103-104; cf. Congar, ‘Regards et Réflexions…’ pp. 477-478.  
26 Johannes Zachhuber, Luther’s Christological Legacy: Christocentrism and the Chalcedonian Tradition (The Père 
Marquette Lecture in Theology 2017) (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2017), p. 47. 
 
  
Weinandy and Congar, suggesting that Luther is rather happy to elide the distinction 
between ‘nature’ and ‘person’ in his Christological formulae.27 
 
Thomasius suggests in his account of kenosis that a symmetry in the communicatio 
idiomatum led inevitably to divine passibility, and that this was the tendency, at least, of 
Lutheran christology from Luther onwards.28 He offers no real evidence for this claim, and 
it is probably best read as a theoretical account of what he believes the doctrine would 
have looked like if dogmaticians had been consistent, rather than a historical account of 
what was actually taught.29 
 
Mozley goes on to note that no significant dogmatician or historian of dogma treated the 
question through the nineteenth century or in the early part of the twentieth.30 He 
expresses surprise that Ritschl and von Harnack had nothing to say, given that 
impassibility ‘could be represented as a piece of Greek metaphysics.’31 Instead, the 
challenges to the doctrine have come two sources: from what he terms ‘metaphysics’, by 
which he seems particularly to mean both, first, a focus on the personality of the deity, 
similar to Dorner’s ethical turn, and a broader personalistic philosophy; and, second, what 
he terms ‘natural science’, by which he seems to mean a panentheistic move in which God 
suffers all that any creature suffers.32 
 
Nearly a century on, not only many of the names, but also many of the concepts, Mozley 
found to be important have passed into historical irrelevance; however, his identification 
of a ‘metaphysical’ move, and his expressed surprise at Ritschl’s silence, continue to 
resonate in more recent discussion. Both turn on a sense that the foundational conception 
of the being of God received in the theological tradition was somehow wrong, or at best 
unbalanced. He concludes the book posing six questions, the first of which ‘concerns the 
nature of God as the Absolute … and, at the same time, as personal.’33 A merely absolute 
deity might be impassible; a deity possessed of personality must be passible in some 
sense. Dorner’s ethical turn made the question of divine passibility urgent. 
 
At the start of the later twentieth-century development stands a parallel dissatisfaction 
with an inherited doctrine of God. Two (related) early discussions of Feuerbach by Barth 
(which coincidentally are almost contemporaneous with Mozley’s book) offer a way in to 
this question.34 Barth reads Feuerbach’s critique of theology remarkably positively: in 
claiming that the account of God offered by the (Schleiermachian) theologians of his day 
                                                 
27 Zachhuber, Luther’s Christological Legacy…, pp. 100-101. 
28 Thomasius, Beiträge, pp. 31ff. 
29 Welch suggests he sees it as ‘the intention and direction of the Lutheran Christological development’. God 
and Incarnation, p. 27. 
30 He references many authors who did address the issue in the six decades before he wrote; the only two 
whose memory has generally survived are Horace Bushnell and William Temple. Mozley, Impassibility, pp. 
140-166. 
31 Mozley, Impassibility, p. 129. 
32 Mozley, Impassibility, pp. 130-139. 
33 Mozley, Impassibility, p. 177. 
34 ‘Ludwig Feuerbach’(identified as an extract from lectures given in 1920) in Karl Barth (tr. Louise Pettibone 
Smith), Theology and Church: Selected Shorter Writings 1920-1928 (London: SCM Press, 1962), pp.217-237, and 
Barth (tr. Brian Cozens and John Bowden), Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century: Its background and 
history (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), pp. 520-526. 
 
  
was nothing but an account of projected human desires, Feuerbach was simply right, and 
was doing a great service to theology, demonstrating the inadequacy and bankruptcy of a 
theological method that was genuinely without validity.35 Christian theology is not 
projection, Barth believes, but reception of revelation, and therefore impervious to 
Feuerbach’s critique. 
 
Now, this might be right or wrong, but it offers a significant conceptual distinction, which 
may be employed regardless of the correctness of the particular claim concerning 
Feuerbach. Barth invites us to distinguish, at least conceptually, between the God-talk of a 
given theological tradition and true Christian theology. Jüngel used later Barthian themes 
to press a similar distinction between ‘the God of the philosophers’ or ‘traditional 
dogmatics’ and a trinitarian and christological doctrine of God.36 In his account of Barth’s 
doctrine of God, Jüngel follows a fairly common nineteenth- and twentieth-century line of 
suggesting the problem is a hellenistic infection of the God-talk of the early church—this 
tradition was of course dominant enough in Ritschl to explain Mozley’s surprise, noted 
earlier. 
 
Virtually every major proponent of divine passibility in recent decades has held to an 
account like this. The doctrine of God found in the Christian tradition—‘traditional 
dogmatics’, in Jüngel’s terms—is basically wrong, led into error by importing categories 
from Greek metaphysics that are incompatible with proper Christian thought about God.37 
This anti-metaphysical turn has important roots in Baur’s, now completely discredited, 
theory of an early conflict between Petrine and Pauline schools in the early church,38 but it 
has better-placed roots as well, in Ritschl and, particularly, Herrmann. 
 
Assuming that Kant’s critical philosophy had in fact destroyed the possibility of 
metaphysics, and that post-Hegelian Romantic attempts to evade this had in fact failed, 
Herrmann borrowed gratefully from Schleiermacher the idea that theology is a description 
of human apprehensions of the divine, and from Ritschl the confidence that critical 
historical study could reconstruct the normative piety of Jesus of Nazareth, and so 
dismissed any metaphysical speculation beyond, perhaps, the bare affirmation of the 
                                                 
35 In the 1920 text, unsurprisingly, Barth also notes Feuerbach’s usefulness to ‘the workers’ socialist 
movement’. ‘Ludwig Feuerbach’, p. 233. 
36 These points tend to be most emphatic when Jüngel is discussing Feuerbach, Nietzsche, and the death of 
God theologians; see for example ‘“Deus qualum Paulus creavit, Dei negatio” Zur Denkbarkeit Gottes bei 
Ludwig Fueuerbach und Friedrich Nietzsche. Eine Beobachtung’ Nietzsche-Studien 1 (1972), pp. 286-96. For 
the point in the major works, see Gott als Geheimnis der Welt (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1978), pp. 
192-5. On this see John B. Webster, Eberhard Jüngel: An Introduction to His Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), p.81, or Colin E. Gunton, ‘The Being and Attributes of God: Eberhart Jüngel’s 
dispute with the classical philosophical tradition’ in John B. Webster, ed., The Possibilities of Theology: Studies 
in the theology of Eberhart Jüngel in his sixtieth year (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), pp. 7-22. Gunton’s own 
doctoral work had similarly located Barth (and Hartshorne, who has arguably aged less well) as an 
alternative to a ‘classical theism’. Colin E. Gunton, Becoming and Being: The doctrine of God in Charles 
Hartshorne and Karl Barth (London: SCM Press, 20012). 
37 Alongside works from Jüngel and Gunton already referenced, see for representative example Robert W. 
Jenson, Systematic Theology vol. 1: The Triune God (Oxford: OUP, 1999), pp. 6-11. 
38 For a quick summary of Baur’s proposal, and an account of the main lines of critique (which have to do 
with Baur relying on impossible datings of NT writings) see Stephen Neill and Tom Wright, The 
Interpretation of the New Testament 1861-1986 (Oxford: OUP, 1988), pp.20-30. 
 
  
existence of God.39 In its place he put an account of the (historically recovered) piety of 
Jesus as the norm of theology. Herrmann’s influence on Barth has been well-charted, 
particularly (in the anglophone literature) by McCormack.40 On McCormack’s telling, 
Barth continued to accept Herrmann’s evaluation of the impossibility of metaphysics, but 
came to the view that, through divine revelation, we could know far more of God’s life 
than Herrmann ever suspected; as a result, Barth’s continued deployment of the 
traditional vocabulary of technical Christology (e.g.) conceals a fundamental break with 
the tradition, and a thoroughgoing redefinition of the terms. To take an example from a 
different essay, McCormack asserts that ‘…what Barth has done is to dispense with the 
metaphysical conception of the “person” of Christ altogether. There is no “person” 
somehow “beneath” the two natures … The two “natures”—really, divine and human 
being—are made one in a single human history.’41 
 
According to McCormack, then, Barth arrives at the same christological position that 
Weinandy and Congar argue Luther had come to: the ‘person’ is merely the coming 
together in history of the two natures. Barth was led to this position through a Kantian 
rejection of the possibility of metaphysics, mediated by Herrmann, rather than through 
Luther’s eucharistic reflections, but he nonetheless arrives (or at least can be read as 
arriving) in the same place. It is little surprise, then, to discover Barth’s Lutheran 
disciples—Jüngel supremely, but followed by Jenson and many others—developing 
doctrines of God that embrace the symmetry of the interchange of attributes, and therefore 
affirm divine passibility. 
 
Thus far I have merely sought to make good on my opening claim that it has been a 
commonplace in theology since about 1860 to suggest that Lutheran christology leads 
naturally, even inevitably, to kenoticism and divine passibility. The argument for 
kenoticism is more straightforward: Dorner gives us the vital link, accusing his own work, 
and his arguments has been accepted and repeated both by historians of dogma, and by 
those interested in developing or criticising kenotic theories. Concerning passibility, I have 
argued that a development that had little to do with Luther led a significant strand of 
modern theology to agree with Luther’s basic christological position, and from it to 
develop quickly ideas of divine passibility. In both cases, however, the claim that a 
Lutheran christology leads quickly to kenoticism and divine passibility are common. 
 
It is worth noting explicitly that these arguments are accepted by supporters (Thomasius; 
Brown) and opponents (Dorner) of kenoticism, and by supporters (Jenson; Moltmann) and 
opponents (Weinandy) of divine passibility. Further, my examples have included English, 
German, French, and American writers, Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Reformed, and 
Anglicans. The ubiquity and consistency of these arguments is quite remarkable; I will 
now demonstrate that they are simply wrong. 
                                                 
39 Consider for example, ‘Our conceptions of the divine attributes express the way in which faith recognises 
God’s working. We have no right to distinguish from this, as did the older dogmatics, a knowledge of God’s 
nature. The conceptions whereby the older theology proposed to apprehend God’s nature are un-Biblical 
and have no value for faith.’ Wilhelm Hermann (tr. Nathaniel Micklem and Kenneth A. Saunders), 
Systematic Theology (New York: Macmillan, 1927), §37 (p. 97 of the edition cited). 
40 Bruce L. McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its genesis and development, 1909-
1936 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), pp. 49-68. 
41 Bruce L. McCormack, ‘The Person of Christ’ in Kelly M. Kapic and Bruce L. McCormack (eds) Mapping 
Modern Theology: A Thematic and Historical Introduction (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2012), pp. 149-173, p. 171. 
  
 
 
2. Why Lutheran christology does not lead to kenosis or passibility 
By ‘Lutheran christology’ I do not mean primarily the thought of Martin Luther; I have 
noted above ambiguities and outright contradictions in Luther’s own christological 
writings, which make it possible to argue that a wide variety of positions are authentic 
representations of his thought. Rather, I mean the developed scholastic christology of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
 
My argument is not merely that the scholastic theologians did not teach the genus 
tapeinoticum, and all that follows from it; that point is generally accepted. Rather, I intend 
to show that they had solid dogmatic reasons for refusing it, and so were properly 
immune to the pull of kenosis or passibility.42 I further intend to show that (at least some 
of) their reasons for refusing the genus tapeinoticum have nothing to do with a commitment 
to impassibility, immutability, or simplicity, but are based firmly in trinitarian and 
christological dogma. 
 
The history as it is generally told can be summed up with a quotation from McCormack: 
‘both Reformed and Lutheran theologians identified the genus tapeinoticum as a strictly 
logical possibility which they rejected. They held that the idea of an ascription of human 
attributes to God was unthinkable largely as a consequence of their commitment to a 
concept of divine immutability that was itself controlled by the notion of impassibility.’43 
The hellenistic infection, or improper commitment to metaphysics, was, that is, the only 
thing that prevented the Lutheran scholastics from teaching a symmetrical interchange of 
attributes between the natures. Even Schmid’s classic summary of the scholastic Lutheran 
theology gives this same impression: discussing the genus maiestaticum, he notes the 
following: 
there is no reciprocal effect produced; for, while the human nature can become 
partaker of the idiomata of the divine, and thus acquire an addition to the idiomata 
essential to itself, the contrary cannot be maintained , because the divine nature in its 
essence is unchangeable and can suffer no increase.44 (my italics) 
 
Were one looking for support for this thesis (that hellenistic infection is the reason for 
denying the genus tapeinoticum) in the scholastics, it would not be hard to find. They 
certainly believed that the divine essence is unchangeable, and so they were ready to 
argue in these ways. Gerhard,45 for example, asserts that ‘the deity of the Logos which is 
                                                 
42 What follows here is an extensive development of some themes I explored very briefly in an earlier essay: 
Stephen R. Holmes, ‘Radicalising the Communicatio: Jenson’s theology in confessional Lutheran perspective’ 
in Stephen J. Wright and Chris E. W. Green (eds) The Promise of Robert W. Jenson’s Theology: Constructive 
Engagements (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2017), pp. 131-141. 
43 Bruce L. McCormack, “Divine Impassibility or Simply Divine Constancy? Implications of Karl Barth’s 
Later Christology for Debates over Impassibility,” in Divine Impassibility and the Mystery of Human Suffering, 
ed. James F. Keating and Thomas Joseph White (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), pp. 150-186, quotation 
from p. 175. 
44 Heinrich Schmid (tr. Charles A. Hay), The Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church 
(Philadelphia: United Lutheran Publishing House, 18753) pp. 314-15. 
45 Johann Gerhard (1582-1637), whose massive Loci Theologiae (1610-1621) stands as one of the great works of 
scholastic Lutheranism. For his life, context, and work, see now Markus Friedrich, Sascha Salatowsky, & 
 
  
united with flesh is most pure act, most perfect, and immutable,’46 and Quenstedt47 will 
insist, even more straightforwardly, that the divine nature cannot be the subject of 
communication because it is ‘immutable and cannot be added to’.48 My claim, then, is not 
that the scholastics did not make arguments based on immutability, but that they offered 
other dogmatic reasons to reject the genus tapeinoticum, rooted in their careful accounts of 
the hypostatic union and the doctrine of the Trinity, which did not rely on any position 
that might be characterised as an ‘hellenistic infection’. Two particular arguments are 
visible, which I will first state, and then explore in detail. 
1. The union of divine and human natures in the person of the incarnate Son was an 
asymmetrical act, an assumption of human nature by the divine person; the detail of 
this asymmetry necessarily results in the denial of the genus tapeinoticum. 
2. Human nature and divine nature are different things, which is a necessary result of the 
doctrine of the Trinity. The detail of this difference leads both to the affirmation of the 
genus maiestaticum and the denial of the genus tapeinoticum. 
 
The first point is already visible in Brenz,49 writing only a few years after Luther’s death. 
He states (in a phrase quoted approvingly by Jenson), ‘[a]lthough it is a property only of 
the divine nature in Christ to be everywhere and fill all things, nevertheless he possesses 
this property only in common with his human nature, that he assumed into the one and 
same person that he is.’50 Brenz makes nothing of the asymmetry here, but carefully 
indicates it: the divine Logos actively assumes human nature into personal subsistence 
with himself; the humanity is passively assumed. Brenz, that is, gestures towards the 
anhypostatic origin of the human nature (and implicitly towards the enhypostatic 
existence of the human nature: the one person, fully divine and fully human, who the 
                                                 
Luise Schorn-Schütte (heraus.) Konfession, Politik, und Gelehrsamkeit. Der Jenaer Theologe Johann Gerhard 
(1582—1637) im Kontext seiner Zeit (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2017). 
46 ‘Deitas Logou carni unita est purissimus actus, est perfectissima et immutabilis…’ Johann Gerhard, Loci 
Theologie (ed. Preuss) IX vols; vol. I (Berlin: Gustav Schlawitz, 1864) iv.257 (p. 576 of edition cited). 
47 J. A. Quenstedt (1617-1688): Gerhard’s nephew, his Theologia Didactico-Polemica (1685) is arguably the most 
scholastic of all Lutheran theological texts, in both the best and worst senses of that term. There appears to 
be little recent secondary literature, unfortunately; Michael Coors, Scriptura efficax. Die biblisch-dogmatische 
Grundlegung des theologischen Systems bei Johann Andreas Quenstedt. Ein dogmatischer Beitrag zu Theorie und 
Auslegung des biblischen Kanons als Heiliger Schrift (Forschungen zur systematischen und ökumenischen Theologie, 
Bd 123) (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009) is useful on the shape and (particularly) the Scripture-
principle of Quenstedt’s theology, but offers little explicitly on his christology; there is a brief but interesting 
treatment of Trinitarian theology (pp. 232-239), which however does not engage with the themes I am 
developing here. 
48 ‘Subjectum Quo est Natura, ad quam facta est communicatio. Est vero illa non divina, utpote cui ob 
summam immutabilitatem nihil addi potest.’ Johanne Andrea Quenstedt Theologia Didactico-Polemica, sive 
Systema Theologicum… (Lipsiae (sic, ‘Leipzig’): Thomas Fritsch, 1715), III.75 (col. 144 of the edition cited). 
49 Johannes Brenz (1499-1570) was present at the Heidelberg Disputation (1518), and became committed to 
the cause of Reform on hearing Luther there. He was a major administrative leader of early Lutheranism, 
whose writings on church order were influential into the twentieth century; his other great contribution was 
a polemical defence of Lutheran Eucharistic theology, focussing on the question of the genus maiestaticum, De 
personali unionem duarum naturarum in Christo (1561). For a full account of Brenz’s Christology see Hans 
Christian Brandy, Die späte Christologie des Johannes Brenz (Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1991). He deals with this 
point concerning asymmetry on pp. 193-4. 
50 ‘Quare etsi solius diuinae naturae in Christo properietas est, ubique esse & omnia implere, tamen habet 
hanc proprietatem communem, cum sua humanitate, quam in eandem personam assumpsit.’ Johannes 
Brenz, De personali unione duarum naturam in Christo (Tübingen, 1561), p. 11; translation from Jenson, ST, 
I.203. 
 
  
mediator is, is the Second Person of the Trinity). Of itself, this proves nothing,51 but later 
dogmaticians made it do considerable work; I consider Gerhard and Quenstedt. 
 
Gerhard’s eleventh proposed objection to the genus maiestaticum turns on reciprocity, and 
addresses precisely the argument I am considering in this essay: if the communicatio is 
reciprocal, then we would have to ascribe mortality to the divine nature just as we ascribe 
omnipotence to the human nature. But (Gerhard thinks) that is obviously absurd, so we 
need to demonstrate that there in asymmetry, not reciprocity, in the communicatio.52 
Gerhard distinguishes between the genus idiomaticum, which he accepts is reciprocal, and 
the genus maiestaticum, which he insists is not. Why so? Because although the union is 
symmetrical with regard to natures, the ‘condition of the natures in the union is not 
equal.’53 Gerhard goes on to make explicitly the point that Brenz made carefully but 
silently: ‘The Logos is the assuming person, the human nature is assumed.’54 Since, he 
argues, the human nature is assumed into the hypostasis of the Logos, the natural 
properties of the Logos are communicated to the human nature; the human nature, being 
assumed, receives but does not give in this exchange of properties. In being assumed into 
a divine person, the human nature is made capacious of the divine perfections, and so the 
genus maiestaticum obtains; the divine nature is never assumed into a human person, and 
so the genus tapeinoticum does not. 
 
Quenstedt makes the same argument again, when he discusses the enhypostatic existence 
of the human nature in one of the polemical sections of his Theologia Didacto-Polemica.55 He 
responds to an argument (which he attributes to the Calvinists in general, and particularly 
to Joseph Grabius) that the human nature remains anhypostatic. Quenstedt clearly 
believes (and implies that his opponents believe) that if he can once prove the 
enhypostasia, the assumption of the human nature into the person of the Logos, such that 
the human nature has its hypostatic existence in the person of the Logos, then the genus 
maiestaticum will inevitably follow.56 He repeatedly insists that the asymmetry of the act of 
assumption means that there need be no symmetry concerning the communication of 
attributes. The person of the Logos assumes the human nature into subsistence with 
himself, and so the human nature is taken up into the majesty of the Logos; there is no 
reciprocal action. His polemical purpose in this section means the theme constantly re-
appears in different ways. It is already present in the thesis statement: ‘He has the divine 
nature of the Logos first and of himself, the human nature second and of another.’57 
 
The scholastic care of Quenstedt’s argument is remarkable. Faced at one point with the  
objection (which he identifies as ‘Calvinist’) that the human nature cannot have any 
hypostatic existence, since anything that has hypostatic existence is a person, and the 
                                                 
51 A point on which I was in error in my ‘Radicalising the communicatio…’ essay. 
52 This is a restatement of the italicised argument at the beginning of Gerhard, Loci, iv.257 (p. 576 of the 
edition cited).  
53 ‘Quamvis enim unio naturarum sit aequalis et reciproca, tamen conditio naturarum unitarum non est 
aequalis.’ Gerhard, Loci, iv.257 (p. 576). 
54 ‘Logos est persona assumens, humana natura assumitur.’ Gerhard, Loci, iv.257 (p. 576). 
55 Quenstedt, Theologia… III.ii Q.IV (cols 190-198). 
56 See, e.g., III.ii Q.IV Antithesis IV (col. 193). 
57 ‘Logos… divina natura logou iam habeat protos et kat’ auto, humana vero deuteros et kat’ allo…’ Quenstedt, 
Theologie… III.ii Q.IV Thesis (col. 190). 
 
  
human nature is not a person, he responds by claiming ambiguity in the term ‘hypostatic 
existence’ and forcing a distinction, essentially creating space for enhypostatic existence.58 
 
When he turns explicitly to the communcatio idiomatum in his polemics,59 he works 
methodically, first discussing the idea in general, then the genus maiestaticum, and then 
enumerating several divine perfections which are (he believes) communicated under it, 
and defending their communication one by one. His very first observation following his 
thesis statement on the genus maiestaticum is all about asymmetry: 
Reciprocity, which has a place in the first genus, does not occur in this genus of the 
communicatio idiomatum: for although it is appropriate for the human nature to be 
advanced or exalted, it is not possible for the divine nature to be humiliated 
[tapeinosis], emptied [kenosis] or lessened … The assumed nature is promoted, not the 
assuming one.60 
Here we see the immutability argument that McCormack identified, to be sure; we also see 
however the asymmetry argument in the final line. As we move on through his 
arguments, it is clear that asymmetry is what is crucial to him. Responding to Calvinist 
claims that divine simplicity makes the genus maiestaticum impossible, Quenstedt first 
offers a series of exegetical arguments proving the possibility of communication of divine 
perfections, but then leans on the distinction between communication of the divine 
essence, which he agrees is impossible, and communication from the divine person, which 
he wishes to assert.61 Note that the possibility of the genus tapeinoticum is not in view here, 
but the arguments advanced serve to refute it anyway; he is developing an asymmetrical 
account of the incarnation, which event therefore, on his account, has radically different 
consequences for the divine and human natures. 
 
Later he does face the possibility of reciprocity. He is pressed (he states) by Calvinists and 
Jesuits, in the mouth of which unlikely alliance he puts the following argument: ‘If, 
because of the perichoretic nature of the personal union, the divine nature communicates 
its properties to the human, then so must the human nature contribute its properties to the 
divine…’ Quenstedt’s response is straightforward: ‘There is no reciprocal equality in the 
union of natures’.62 The divine nature unites; the human nature is assumed; the person of 
the Logos does the assuming. A battery of citations follow, from Leo, Athanasius, and 
Augustine. 
 
Baier makes the same point, albeit in slightly different terms.63 Because of the asymmetry 
in the act of assumption, he suggests that ‘the divine nature inwardly penetrates and 
                                                 
58 Quenstedt, Theologia… III.ii. Q.IV Obj. iv (col. 196). 
59 Quenstedt, Theologica…, III.ii QQ.IX-XIV (col. 222-285) 
60 ‘Reciprocatio, quad in primo genere locum habet, in hoc genere Communcationis Idiomatum secondum 
non datur: Neque enim uti fit naturae humanae beltiosis sive huperupsosis, ita etiam naturae divinae tapeinosis, 
kenosis, elatiosis fieri potest … Assumpti provectio est, non assumentis.’ Quenstedt, Theologica… III.ii. Q.X 
Ekth. I (col. 228). 
61 Quenstedt, Theologica… III.ii Q.X Obj. 2. 
62 ‘Si propter unionem personalem et naturarum perichoresin natura divina comunicat idiomata sua 
humanae, propter eandem etiam humana natura communicabit idiomata sua divinae’; ‘Resp. Non pariter 
reciproca est unio respectu utriusque naturae.’ Quenstedt, Theologia…III.ii Q.X obj. iix (col.237-238). 
63 Johann Wilhelm Baier (1647-1695) is chiefly remembered for his Compendium Theologiae Positivae, which, as 
the title suggests, is largely a drawing together of the teachings of earlier Lutheran theologians.  
 
  
perfects the human; but the human does not in turn penetrate or perfect the divine.’64 
Given the dogmatically-proper use of ‘perichoresis’ to describe the hypostatic union, I am 
not sure that this is the happiest way of phrasing the distinction, but it is further evidence 
that the point I am developing concerning asymmetry is simply central to scholastic 
Lutheran christology. Many other examples could be adduced. 
 
From all this evidence it should be clear both that the Lutheran scholastics were energetic 
in insisting on an asymmetry in the act of hypostatic union, and that they believed that 
this asymmetry allowed them to affirm the genus maiestaticum whilst denying the genus 
tapeinoticum. How far does this argument work? Certainly the proposed asymmetry allows  
them to deny that the one must necessarily lead to the other: the argument from 
reciprocity fails, because there is no reciprocity. They seem to want to go further, however, 
and suggest that the personal assumption of the human nature by the Logos is itself 
adequate to establish the genus maiestaticum. This is a surprising argument, since personal 
assumption is ecumenical orthodoxy, and has been since Chalcedon, and yet the genus 
maiestaticum is a Lutheran distinctive. The argument would seem to rely on a particular 
account of how properties adhere to natures, which must go something like this: natures 
are abstractions that describe clusters of properties which identify kinds: to be divine is to 
be omnipotent, omniscient, etc., and ‘divine nature’ is an abstract term we use to denote 
this cluster of properties. Persons are actually existent things (hypostases), and so are 
actually possessed of properties. The nature that is instantiated in a particular person, 
therefore, must be possessed of all the properties which that particular person is possessed 
of. 
 
The person of the incarnate Logos is possessed of both human and divine properties, and 
so the nature instantiated in the person must also be so possessed. Therefore (as we saw 
Quenstedt claiming above), the establishment of the enhypostasia is enough to prove the 
genus maiestaticum. I assume that his reasoning looked something like the argument I have 
just sketched, although unfortunately he does not pause to explain it to us. However, this 
particular account of natures as abstractions is very reminiscent of the work of another 
leading Lutheran dogmatician, Martin Chemnitz, who preceded Quenstedt and so can be 
presumed to have influenced him.65 
 
The argument I have stated works, but it is also fatally flawed for my purposes: it is 
symmetrical; it proves the genus tapeinoticum just as effectively as it proves the genus 
maiestaticum. Chemnitz, however, had already seen that, and provided a response. He 
begins De Duabus Naturis by defining his terms: ‘nature’ is ‘something common to the 
                                                 
64 ‘…divina natura humanam intime pentrat et perficit; humana vero non vicissim penetrat ac perficit 
divinam.’  Johann Wilhelm Baier (curavit E. Preuss), Compendium Theologiae Positivae (Berolini [sic, Berlin]: 
Sclawitz, 1864). 
65 Martin Chemnitz (1522-1586) is frequently ascribed the pre-eminent place amongst Lutheran 
dogmaticians, after Luther himself, and for that reason sometimes styled ‘the second Martin’. His 
commentary on the Council of Trent is one of the great defences of Protestantism, and he wrote three books 
on the Eucharistic controversy, of which one, De Duabus Naturis in Christo, focused exclusively on the 
christological problems. J.P.H. Preuss, The Second Martin: The Life and Theology of Martin Chemnitz (St Louis: 
Concordia, 1994) is perhaps a little popular in tone, but offers an easy introduction for Anglophone readers; 
Hendrick Klinge, Verheißene Gegenwart: Die Christologie des Martin Chemnitz (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2015) is the most recent scholarly treatment of his Christology. 
 
  
many individual members of the same species.’66 Almost immediately, however, he 
introduces the crucial asymmetry: ‘[w]e must note, as Damascenus points out in De Fide 
Orthodoxa I.8, that in creatures the nature common to each does not subsist in itself…’67 
‘Humanity’, that is, is an abstraction, it exists only in that particular humans exist, and 
share certain properties. Chemnitz, that is, states the definitions that I have argued must 
have been in place for the Lutheran argument I was tracing to work. 
 
He then, however, introduces a crucial distinction, already hinted at in the phrase ‘in 
creatures’ in the citation from John of Damascus.  ‘[I]n the case of the deity, its common 
nature of essence is not something imaginary or only an abstract thought or something 
which only appears to be one, but it actually is the one and undivided deity, which, 
however, is communicable and is common to the Three Persons.’68 
 
The point is a basic one, predicated on standard trinitarian orthodoxy: the unity of the 
divine nature is a reality (indeed, possibly ‘Reality itself’), not an abstraction. The three 
Persons are truly and really and actually one God. He goes on to explain this point at 
careful length: 
The divine essence is predicated of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, not 
as a genus is predicated of a species, or as a species is predicated of an individual, or 
as a whole of its parts, but in an entirely ineffable and incomprehensible way the 
hypostases or persons of the Trinity are all one because of the identity of essence. 
Hence they do not differ in essence, nor do they subsist separately, one outside the 
other, or one without the other. ‘For the Father is in Me and I in the Father,’ says the 
Son (John 10:38).69 
Every creaturely nature, that is, is, according to Chemnitz, merely an abstraction, but the 
divine nature exists as the unity of the Godhead. This is a different asymmetry to the one I 
have previously explored, but it helps Chemnitz to do much of the same work. (Chemnitz 
is happy to employ the other asymmetry as well.70) 
 
Chemnitz’s initial definition of ‘person’ is straightforward: ‘an individual, intelligent, 
incommunicable substance which is not part of something else, is not sustained by 
something else, and does not depend on something else.’71 He makes the necessary move I 
identified above, however, in his defence of the genus maiestaticum, where he objects to the 
‘sophistry’ of asserting that the divine perfections were communicated only to the person, 
not to the human nature, by asserting that there is no referent for the word ‘person’ except 
the union of the natures: ‘the person of Christ consists of the two natures which make up 
the one unique person of Christ’.72 (Note that this is precisely the position McCormack 
claimed Barth arrived at, that, he claimed, invited Barth’s followers to assert the genus 
tapeinoticum and divine passibility.) 
                                                 
66 Martin Chemnitz De Duabus Naturis in Christo… (Lipsiae [sic Leipzig]: no press stated, 1580), p.7; ET from 
Chemnitz (tr. J.A.O. Preuss), The Two Natures in Christ (St Louis: Concordia, 1971), p. 29. 
67 Chemnitz, De Duabus p. 8; Two Natures, p. 30. 
68 Chemnitz, De Duabus, p. 8 Two Natures, p. 30. 
69 Chemnitz, De Duabus, p. 8 Two Natures, p. 30. 
70 ‘…the divine nature in the person of the Son has assumed the human nature…’ Chemnitz, De Duabus p. 9; 
Two Natures p. 31; this is actually part of a quotation from Lombard, Sent. 4.27. 
71 Chemnitz, De Duabus, pp. 7-8; Two Natures, p. 29. 
72 Chemnitz, De Duabus, p. 298; Two Natures, p. 283. 
 
  
 
Chemnitz’s account of the hypostatic union affirms this point, and also displays the 
asymmetry that I have been stressing: ‘the hypostatic union is the highest and most 
intimate coming together by which the divine nature assumes and the human nature is 
assumed and made the property of the divine, so that these two natures … are united to 
produce one person in Christ.’73 In explanation, he will immediately however make a 
further distinction: ‘the person of the Son of God, subsisting from eternity in the divine 
nature, assumed in fullness of time a particular individual unit (massa) of human nature, 
so that in Christ the assuming nature is the divine, and the assumed nature is the 
human.’74 Because of this, and because of the individuation possible in created natures, the 
particular human nature assumed subsists only in the person of the Logos, and is made a 
‘property’ of the Logos. On the basis of this, Chemnitz argues, ‘Christ’s divine nature did 
not pertain only to the completeness of the person of the incarnate Christ, but at the same 
time also pertained to the assumed human nature.’75 On this account, he asserts the genus 
maiestaticum and denies the genus tapeinoticum, insisting that both the assertion and the 
denial are the result of the assumption of the human nature into the person of the Logos.76 
 
I cannot find Quenstedt stating the same definitions of ‘person’ and ‘nature’ as Chemnitz 
advances, but he regularly cites Chemnitz, and his logic, as sketched above, seems to rely 
on Chemnitz’s definitions, so I think we may accept that he uses at least very similar 
conceptions. There is, then, a sense in which my first and second numbered arguments 
above are similar, but Quenstedt’s focus on the asymmetry and Chemnitz’s on the nature 
of natures seem sufficiently different to make them different arguments. 
 
So, we have an argument from christology and an argument from trinitarian doctrine. The 
writers cited had many other arguments for the genus maiestaticum, of course: Chemnitz in 
particular offers an essentially exegetical defence of the doctrine, with a massive collation 
of Biblical texts and citations of ancient authors being far more important to his account 
than the narrow logical distinctions I am exploring here. My point has been to show that, 
even absent any belief in divine immutability and/or impassibility, the Lutheran 
Orthodox had adequate dogmatic resources to refuse any suggestion of a symmetry or 
reciprocity between the genus maiestaticum and the genus tapeinoticum. They understood 
the incarnation to be an essentially asymmetric assumption of human nature by the divine 
person of the Logos; that asymmetry, they believed, meant that the communication of 
attributes between the natures happened in one direction but not in another. On this basis, 
the widespread historical thesis I explored in the first section of this essay is demonstrably 
wrong: Lutheran christology does not imply kenosis or divine passibility. 
 
 
3. Suffering and ‘classical theism’: Implications for contemporary theology 
It is tempting to ask if any of this matters; the era of the schools is long over, and the 
precise details of why they affirmed what they affirmed and denied what they denied are 
at most of minor historical interest. Such a hasty dismissal would be a mistake, however. 
                                                 
73 Chemnitz, De Duabus, p. 53; Two Natures, p. 69. 
74 Chemnitz, De Duabus, p. 63; Two Natures, p. 76. 
75 Chemnitz, De Duabus, p. 66; Two Natures, p. 78. 
76 Chemnitz, De Duabus, p. 73. 
  
The argument I have offered speaks directly to two key discussions in contemporary 
dogmatics: the problem of suffering, and the rejection of ‘classical theism’. 
 
Negotiating human suffering is in many ways the decisive issue of modern dogmatics. 
One way or another, almost every significant proposal orbits around this issue. I 
referenced two writers above who claimed that the idea of divine passibility had become 
almost universal in academic theology in the 1980s; it is fair to say that this hegemony has 
not quite been maintained, perhaps as a result of some weighty critiques;77 nonetheless, 
two demands that drove it are still generally perceived as urgent. One concerns divine 
love: even if God does not suffer, we must be able to give some meaningful content to the 
concept of divine benevolence. The other concerns God’s engagement with human 
suffering: even if God does not suffer, we must be able to give some account of how God 
knows our suffering. 
 
My arguments in this paper offer a response to the second point: the asymmetrical account 
of incarnation I have found in the Lutheran Orthodox allows the affirmation that the 
genuine human suffering of the Incarnate One is both known by God, and known by God 
to be the personal experience of the Divine Son, without however invoking an account of 
divine passibility. The sixth-century theopaschite formula, ‘one of the trinity suffered in 
the flesh’, already pointed in this direction78 (although the controversy then was far more 
about the inseparability of divine operations than suffering; accounts of the impassible 
suffering of the incarnate Son had been common since at least Cyril of Alexandria79). 
Contemporary references to patristic ideas of impassible suffering tend to be impatient, 
suggesting that logical incoherence was accepted because of an alien commitment to 
divine impassibility; the scholastic account of the incarnation I have been tracing in this 
essay, however, demonstrates that it is possible to hold to these patristic ideas without any 
incoherence, and so offers a significant alternative option to a central contemporary 
debate.  
 
Turning to classical theism, I noted above that an account of the older doctrine of God—
the doctrine of the Lutheran scholastics, amongst others—as inadequate because of 
metaphysical infection is routinely assumed in recent systematic theology. As I have 
explored, this can be traced back to Baur and Herrmann in different ways, but in much 
contemporary systematic theology it functions as an axiom, an unexamined assumption 
which is quickly stated without any apology or defence because it is seemingly beyond 
question. Doctrines of simplicity, immutability, impassibility, and so on, are seen as 
endemic and hardy weeds that the contemporary systematician must pull out from 
amongst the good plants, in the hope that something of use or at least ornament will be 
left once the operation is complete. 
 
It is remarkable just how pervasive and strident this assumption is. Barth (who however 
does better than most here in my estimation) speaks of simplicity as ‘exalted to the all-
                                                 
77 See particularly Thomas G. Weinandy, Does God Suffer? (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2000). 
78 For an overview of the theopaschite controversy, see Patrick T. R. Gray, The Defense of Chalcedon in the East, 
451–553 (Leiden: Brill, 1979), 451–553. 
79 See J. Warren Smith, “Suffering Impassibly: Christ’s Passion in Cyril of Alexandria’s Soteriology,” ProEccl 
11 (2002): 463–83. 
 
  
controlling principle, the idol … devouring everything concrete…’80 My own Doktorvater, 
Colin Gunton asserted, ‘[i]t is one of the tragedies—one could almost say crimes—of 
Christian theological history that the Old Testament was effectively displaced by Greek 
philosophy as the theological basis for the doctrine of God…’81 We have met already 
Jenson, Jüngel, Fiddes and Moltmann telling a similar story, but the language here is 
astonishingly strong: ‘idol’; ‘tragedy’; ’crime’. The sense of a basic betrayal, a catastrophic 
error, is difficult to escape. 
 
Of course, the writers named above belong to a particular strand of contemporary 
systematics, being protestant and Barthian (whatever that epithet means). The claim goes 
much wider, however. It can be found in feminist theology,82 open theism,83 even the 
death of God theologies.84 A recent survey of confessionally Evangelical doctrines of God 
suggested that virtually everything currently written in that confessional tradition is 
negotiating this question somehow.85 Further, this theme is deployed as something 
assumed and unquestioned in serious readings of historical figures.86 It is hard not to 
regard it as ubiquitous in contemporary protestant theology.87 
 
There have already been challenges to such ideas, and weighty ones at that. Some focus on 
a particular thinker, arguing that he (almost always…) is not guilty of the general charge 
of a surrender to alien metaphysics. Several recent treatments of Aquinas, for example, 
have taken this line.88 Others focus on one or another of the disputed doctrines, arguing 
that it is not as unbiblical as suggested.89 This is all, however, in danger of being 
piecemeal, in that individual thinkers and concepts are being addressed. Over time, the 
broader historical consensus might suffer a ‘death of a thousand cuts’ but the very 
presence of so many excellent push-backs, and their rather limited efficacy, combine to 
suggest that we might be waiting some time. 
 
                                                 
80 C.D. II/1, p. 329. 
81 Colin E. Gunton, Act and Being: Towards a Theology of the Divine Attributes (London: SCM Press, 2002), p. 3. 
82 See, e.g., Rosemary Radford Ruether, ‘The Liberation of Christology from Patriarchy’, in Ann Loades (ed.), 
Feminist Theology: a Reader (London: SPCK, 1990), pp. 138-148. 
83 See, e.g., Clark Pinnock, et al., The Openness of God: A Biblical challenge to the traditional understanding…  
(Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 1994), p. 106. 
84 Thomas J.J. Altizer, The Apocalyptic Trinity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 61. 
85 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, ‘The Triune God of the Gospel’ in Timothy Larsen and Daniel J. Trier (eds) The 
Cambridge Companion to Evangelical Theology (Cambridge: CUP, 2007), pp. 17-34; see particularly pp. 19-20 
(for the definition of ‘classical theism’) and pp. 22-28 for the judgement that negotiating this is central. 
86 For example, Sang Hyun Lee, The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1988), see the thesis statements on pp. 3-4 for an indication of just how central the assumed 
critique of ‘classical theism’ is to the account. 
87 Breidert offers a similarly broad judgement at the beginning of his monograph, referencing Altizer, 
Moltmann and von Balthasar in particular. Die kenotische Christologie… p. 13. 
88 To offer only three examples, Giles Emery (tr. Francesca Ann Murphy), The Trinitarian Theology of St 
Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: OUP, 2007) offers a careful restatement of Thomas without controversy; Matthew 
Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004) 
brings Thomas into direct conversation with the sort of revisionary proposals I have been considering, as 
does D. Stephen Long, The Perfectly Simple Triune God: Aquinas and his Legacy (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
2016). 
89 For example, on simplicity: Jordan P. Barrett, Divine Simplicity: A Biblical and Trinitarian Account 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2017) and James E. Dolezal, God without Parts: Divine Simplicity and the 
Metaphysics of God’s Absoluteness (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2011); on impassibility Weinandy, Does God Suffer?. 
  
By focusing on Lutheran christology, I hope to have short-circuited some of these 
discussions. As I argued in the first section, a purported result of Lutheran christology, 
divine passibility, is held up repeatedly as the great result of removing Greek metaphysics 
from Christian doctrine. But I have shown that this fails completely: I have allowed, for 
the sake of argument, that such ideas as immutability, impassibility, or eternity are merely 
Greek accretions, and have no place in a Christian doctrine of God; I have demonstrated 
that even under such strictures, the Lutheran schoolmen had compelling reasons for 
assuming that the adoption of the genus maiestaticum does not give any reason to adopt the 
genus tapeinoticum. Rather, the resistance to the latter stems from the straightforward 
deployment of ecumenical dogma concerning the hypostatic union and the Trinity. 
 
I return to Eberhard Jüngel, surely one of the most intellectually able theologians of the 
second half of the twentieth century. Jüngel assumed and asserted that we needed to set ‘a 
trintarian and christological’ doctrine of God against the ‘traditional dogmatics’ that was 
characterised by a denial of divine passibility. I have argued that, in Jüngel’s own 
tradition, the denial of divine passibility was precisely the result of holding to ‘a trinitarian 
and christological doctrine of God.’ If this is right, then the basis of Jüngel’s argument is 
simply undermined. He, and those who would travel a similar road to him (which, as I 
have suggested, can seem to be almost everybody in contemporary protestant dogmatics), 
have no place to stand. The remarkably widespread dogmatic appeal of the last sixteen 
decades or so to a supposed authentic Lutheranism as a justification for a kenotic 
christology, an account of divine passibility, and even a novel doctrine of God, just fails. It 
has no validity. The edifices, admittedly impressive, that are built upon it, are built on 
sand.90 
 
 
                                                 
90 I am very grateful to my colleagues Prof. Judith Wolfe and Dr Bill Tooman for their helpful comments on 
an earlier draft of this paper. 
